Plato Blogging: The Republic Book I

There's a lot there in the beginning of Book I. People give whole lectures on the first sentence for goodness' sake:

I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful.

In keeping with my theme of trying to argue that the book is both about the just and right ordering of the soul and a type of complicated reducio ad absurum about trying to impose this through politics, I will give a brief overview of the primary arguments in the book, but not dwell on every specific detail. Andrew accused me of cherry-picking, so I will try harder to honestly and objectively identify portions which both support and undermine my argument.

First, I think this passage, which the first time I read the book thought strangely out of place, supports my argument about this being primarily about the right ordering of the soul:

How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles, --are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

He's talking about escaping base appetites of love and lust. A master, Sophocles calls it. When the passions release their grip we are free of not just one, but many masters. Ah, but it's not old age, but temper and character. Therefore, we can presumably order ourselves rightly such that we are calm, happy, and free.

I believe it is tremendously important that Plato writes about passions and temperament even before the question of justice is addressed. To most readers this probably seems like an odd introduction into a political text, and indeed it rather is. Unless, of course, you read it with an eye toward the soul being a primary issue, not a secondary one.

Socrates then moves onto Cephalus:

I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

Again, we are still talking about people. In this case, pursuit of wealth. Notice he is still talking about individual people. Or rather a soul type -- oligarchs, who are "very bad company."

Moving along, we get to this:

Hope, he says, cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey; --hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.

This is important, methinks -- "the soul of him who lives in justice" Again, the connection between justice and the soul, all before talking about any type of political organization whatsoever. Although, one could see how this is simply a literary choice to move the dialogue along from people simply talking together into a discussion of Justice and the Good, but I think there's more to it than that.

And then we come to the key question:

Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?

Cephalus' definition actually appears before the question:

a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

Basically, tell the truth and repay debts. It's a simple rule of thumb type argument. Socrates shoots this down with one sentence:

Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him?

Polemarchus then offers up a logic that justice giving people their due:

justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies...justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him

Socrates goes onto dismiss this assertion, but I won't go too much into it basically because friends and enemies do not neatly correspond with Good and Bad.

Then we come to Thrasymachus' famous line:

I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.

There are many ways to look at this deceptively simple statement. He could be making an argument that "might makes right," which is how I believe most people generally understand it. But does he mean simply stronger physically or militarily? Or does he also mean stronger will, desire, or reasons? Would Nietzsche's will to power fall under Thrasymachus' view of justice? Does he mean that any arbitrary or capricious definition of interest by the stronger is necessarily just? Is it just before the imposition by the stronger? If a stronger chooses not to pursue their own interest, are they then acting unjustly? Or does their decision not to act redefine their interests? I'm getting off on all kinds of crazy tangents here, so I'll just move on under the assumption that he means "might makes right," but that it can also be understood to mean the stronger impulses or parts of one's own soul. Indeed, what's interesting to FLG is that these discussions of justice can easily be understood, at some level, as pertaining to the soul instead of an individual's interactions with others.

Anyway, Socrates tries to pick apart Thrasymachus' statement using some of my questions above. But the basic premise is pretty hard to refute. Might makes right is one of those timeless axioms, most eloquently explained in my opinion, within Thucydides' Melian dialogue.

But then it gets more complicated. Socrates talks about how people in every art, physicians, for example, pursue that art for the benefit of others, the patients in this case, not themselves. Therefore, it is implied that a just ruler must pursue politics that are in his subjects' interest. Thrasymachus responds that it's a question of scale:

they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

That last part, injustice is a man's own profit and interest, is fascinating to me because in some ways Socrates and Thrasymachus agree, but it depends whether you are talking about the polis, man, or the soul. But I'll get to that in later books.

Anyway, Thrasymachus admits that he believes "perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice."

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes, [Thrasymachus] said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust

Socrates responds sometime later:

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just?

And Socrates continues:

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves.

And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it.

But happiness and not misery is profitable.

Of course.

Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

So, here we have it. Justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul. Therefore, if this is a book about justice, then this is a book about the soul. Again, what I find so amazing about this book is that Thrasymachus and Socrates are both correct, but at different levels.

An excellent soul, justice, requires perfect injustice in its ordering. Reason must be a tyrant over the will, passions, and appetites so that the soul can work in unison. This ordering becomes easier as we age and the passions lose their grip. But Thrasymachus is correct that injustice is more profitable, but only when reason rightly dominates the weaker passions and appetites. Oddly, the perfect injustice of reason over the rest of the soul produces justice within the soul, and consequently manifest just acts from that person.

Feel free to call bullshit or point out something I've missed. I really do believe this reconciles the inconsistencies and superficially crazy political ideas in the book. They are crazy ideas if they were political ideas, but they aren't. They're about how to manifest perfect injustice within the soul, so that justice can manifest externally. Quite a paradox and contradiction.