Phaedrus is ostensibly about Love, but transitions into a discussion of rhetoric.
First passage I'd like to mention, this is Socrates speaking:
Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers. When opinion by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess. Now excess has many names, and many members, and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name, neither honourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example, which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by it is called a glutton-I the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious, and there can be as little doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called;-it will be the name of that which happens to be eluminant. And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred-that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is called love."
The striking thing for my theory here is the use of words like "rule," "misrule," and "tyrannical" within an individual. What's also interesting is that Socrates seems to believe our desires or appetites naturally draw us to the Good, but that reason must hold the reins, a metaphor that I introduce now in foreknowledge of what is to come later.
Then he moves on to talk of the immortality of the soul:
The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul. But if this be true, must not the soul be the self-moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? Enough of the soul's immortality.
Let's look at the first line in particular:
The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live.
If we assume that government moves people, and by this I mean compels their actions, especially as we'll see in The Republic, then a person's soul ceases to live? Some may consider this a logical leap too far, and perhaps in this specific context, but as part of Plato's larger work I believe it is not. An interesting conclusion, if I am correct, is that ruling or "that which moves another" also causes the soul to cease to live.
Socrates then moves on to a metaphor of the soul as two-horsed chariot. Gods have two noble steeds. Humans have one noble and the other ignoble. I like the metaphor. He does return to linkage of the soul and governance:
the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the character of poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant-all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.
Some may argue that this is where my argument falls apart. That there is a place for each person and Plato means the Just City literally to organize according to those places. I respectfully disagree. He seems to be saying here that we will be what we are destined to be, according to level of our understanding of the Truth. If so, then the important thing remains the right ordering of an individual soul so that next time the person will have moved up the teleology.
A nice description of the different horses and charioteer that make up a human soul commences, and he discusses their actions regarding love. This quote, a little bit later, stuck out:
After this their happiness depends upon their self-control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony-masters of themselves and orderly-enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul; and when the end comes, they are light and winged for flight, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories
Notice he talks about self-control and order and harmony within their own souls, not imposed from the outside. The discussion then transitions, some may think oddly, to a discussion of writing and rhetoric, but they are related. Writing and rhetoric are the politician's tools for controlling others, is it not?
Socrates says:
And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good for evil being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evily-what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?
And
Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed-that is what you have heard?
Notice enchanting the mind, as if by magic spell. It continues...
And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined, to be unjust?
...until we arrive at this line, which I think is crucial:
But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?
Emphasis mine. Rhetoric can disorder our soul.
Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; which will enable us to see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.
I don't think it's a coincidence that Thrasymachus is mentioned here and is Socrates' main opponent in The Republic.
He continues with this argument:
He will argue that is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you arrive at first principles; for, as I said at first, when the question is of justice and good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has; no need of truth-for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction: and this is based on probability, to which who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention.
I think you're getting my point here.
Anyway, I'll leave with one last quotation, a myth about the birth of writing:
At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.
Isn't this, the real gist of this, saying that truth cannot be transmitted in its entirety? That only a portion or semblance can be. If so, then doesn't that imply that each person must pursue truth themselves and organize their own soul accordingly? And lastly, then doesn't that mean that trying to impose justice, which requires knowledge of the truth, is doomed to fail if attempt from outside?
Feel free to disagree or to call my attention to any phrase that you feel doesn't jive with this interpretation. Next, Book I.
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8 comments:
It's Friday afternoon, my brain feels fuzzy, and I have nothing very smart to say. So I'll grope blindly, and I apologize if I've misunderstood you or if what I'm saying is just dumb.
I think the passages you quote (and some more that you don't) make your assertion that Plato thinks we find truth and justice through communion with own souls pretty much unassailable.
But I think Plato also thinks that all souls are basically alike and contain more or less the same things: there's one truth, one justice. Therefore, a philosopher, by knowing his own soul best, also is specially equipped to guide the souls of others (traders, gymnasts, and so on) to the highest virtue of which they're capable.
I guess I'm thinking of the parable of the cave in the Republic: the people who have seen truth most clearly (by means of a reorientation of the soul toward truth) should have extra political power, because they know better than everyone else what's best for their souls too. To return to the Phaedrus: their horses might not be any better than anyone else's, but they know best how to hold the reins.
I'm not saying there's not a limit to the power philosophers should have over others, in Plato's thinking. But I can't think of any way of identifying what that limit could be.
Alpheus:
I understand how one can come away with that impression. But what then to make of:
But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?
And the myth of the origins of writing.
Have you considered that perhaps you're seeing more unity in Plato's writing than is really there? Isn't it just as likely that the lines you find in Phaedrus which are irreconcilable with The Republic are more Socrates-influenced in contrast to the more Plato-dominated later works. This was Karl Popper's contention in The Open Society and Its Enemies and I find it plausible, if not convincing.
Andrew:
This was written roughly simultaneously with The Republic.
I may be getting lost here with the story within the lecture on rhetoric within the philosophy but does this passage, (appearing several lines after the first passage you cite):
“Now to him who has a mind diseased anything is agreeable which is not opposed to him, but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him, and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his beloved; he is always employed in reducing him to
inferiority.”
… and this paragraph or two later:
“Let us next see how his master, whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colours of paint and ornament, and the rest of a piece?”
… in any way continue to make the case for your conclusion: ”government moves people, and by this I mean compels their actions…” and "that which moves another" also causes the soul to cease to live.”
What I’m getting at is: if government moves people, compels their actions, and if that which moves another causes the soul to cease to live, then the government (lover) (master) has a great stake in a citizenry (beloved) (servant) that is weak and soft or, if no, to be made so. Or am I reading way too much into this?
George:
I believe that he is referring to a wrongfully understood Love, such that the lover is a sort of tyrant. In such as case, a tyrant has an interest in a docile slave or population.
But that gets wrapped up in this later for sure.
Andrew:
This was written roughly simultaneously with The Republic.
Oops. That's correct.
But now that I actually went back and read Phaedrus, I no longer agree with you on what Plato was getting at in the Phaedrus. How about the concluding passages after the myth on the origin of writing:
But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring;-being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his others;-and who cares for them and no others-this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.
Plato is saying that truth can't be transmitted, certainly not by writing anyway, but he is not saying that there is no role for philosophers. The job of philosophers is to train the souls of other people as well as his own. Naturally, he must use the Socratic method and force his pupils to work out the answers for themselves, but I think Alpheus is right - Plato thought philosophers should guide the souls of others.
"Naturally, he must use the Socratic method and force his pupils to work out the answers for themselves, but I think Alpheus is right - Plato thought philosophers should guide the souls of others."
I completely agree, but through rhetoric and argument, not through the coercive power of the state. Yet, their task is still difficult because each must "find truth and justice through communion with own souls," to borrow a line from Alpheus. Plus, the philosopher can't fully articulate the truth to transmit it in its entirety.
My difference with the common interpretation of the philosopher king is not that philosophers don't have an important role, or even an important role in ruling. But that they can't create some sort of Utopia.
Trying to manifest perfect justice through the state requires perfect injustice.
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